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COOTER AND RAPPOPORT ON 
THE NORMATIVE 
JOHN B. DAVIS 
Marquette University 
In a recent examination of the origins of ordinal utility theory in neo-
classical economics, Robert D. Cooter and Peter Rappoport argue that 
the ordinalist revolution of the 1930s, after which most economists aban-
doned interpersonal utility comparisons as normative and unscientific, 
constituted neither unambiguous progress in economic science nor the 
abandonment of normative theorizing, as many economists and histo-
rians of economic thought have generally believed (Cooter and Rap-
poport, 1984). Rather, the widespread acceptance of ordinalism, with 
its focus on Pareto optimality, simply represented the emergence of a 
new neoclassical research agenda that, on the one hand, defined eco-
nomics differently than had the material welfare theorists of the cardinal 
utility school and, on the other, adopted a positivist methodology in 
contrast to the less restrictive empiricism of the cardinalists. 
In a later exchange with I. M. D. Little, Cooter and Rappoport sup-
port their view that nothing more than a shift in research agendas was 
involved in the ordinalist revolution by arguing that every conceptual 
framework operates persuasively in the particular way in which it "sin-
gles out objects for analysis, and designates how empirical information 
about them is to be sought, organized and understood" (Cooter and 
Rappoport, 1985, p. 1190). After the 1930s, most economists were simply 
persuaded that the new ordinalist research program did indeed single 
out valuable objects of analysis and strategies for their research. More-
over, they add, "once the normative nature of propositions is under-
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stood in terms of that body of doctrine from which they emanated, it 
then becomes apparent that material welfare economics is no more nOr 
no less normative than ordinalist economics" (ibid.), and, consequently, 
that the change in research agendas did not abandon normative theo-
rizing. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the scientific integrity of car-
dinal utility theory is not jeopardized by the cardinalists' willingness to 
make interpersonal utility comparisons, and the advent of ordinalism 
does not represent unambiguous scientific progress in the development 
of a value-free economics. The analytical revolution in neoclassical ec-
onomic theory in the 1930s might better be said to represent the emerg-
ence of a less self-consciously normative manner of theorizing, although 
normative it remains in virtue of the persuasive way in which its new 
perspective operates. 
In genera!, this characterization of the ordinalist revolution as a 
change in research agendas has much to recommend it. At the same 
time, however, to claim, as do Cooter and Rappoport, that because all 
theory is persuasive in its selective choice'()f objects of investigation and 
methods of analysis, all theory is thereby normative in nature, is to make 
all theory trivially and uninformatively normative. More seriously, to 
claim that a theory's perspective signals its normative content is to con-
fuse normative propositions per se with simply value-laden ones. Yet, 
not only are the two types of propositions recognizably distinct, but the 
frequent ambiguities in a theory's value-laden propositions often permit 
a variety of competing inferences regarding that theory's normative con-
tent .1 
Contrary to Cooter and Rappoport, then, a theory's perspective per 
se does not say much about its normative content. Thus, to say that the 
ordinalist revolution involved basic changes in theoretical perspective 
does little to explain how cardinalism and ordinal ism lead to different 
normative commitments or how the ordinalist revolution involved a 
change in normative understanding. This is a disappointing conclusion 
to draw about an account that makes the transition from cardinalism to 
ordinalism largely a matter of changes in normative thinking, especially 
when there already exists a well-established literature concerning pre-
cisely those changes in normative thinking in neoclassical economics 
1. Normative propositions per se make claims about what is right or wrong, just, fair, 
good for people, and so on. Value-laden propositions, or value-judgments, merely 
express controversial assumptions or ostensibly subjective points of view. Thus, in 
ordinalist theory, for example, the claim that agents' wants are nonsatiable expresses 
a value-laden proposition or value-judgment, while the proposition that individuals 
are better off in situation x than in situation y if and only if they prefer x to y expresses 
a normative proposition per se. The role the former pays in any particular inference 
regarding the latter depends on its interpretation, additional assumptions, among oth-
ers, such that failure to distinguish the two types of propositions obscures the norma-
tive - in the most general sense - structure of the theory in question. 
COOTER AND RAPPOPORT ON THE NORMATIVE 141 
thatemerged with the ordinalist focus on Pareto optimality judgments.2 
How is it, then, that Cooter and Rappoport come to be so misguided 
about the normative in the development of neoclassical economic theory? 
I argue that Cooter and Rappoport and their opponents share a 
prevalent misconception of the normative. This emerges in the exchange 
between Cooter-Rappoport and Little, in which Cooter-Rappoport and 
Little, although disagreeing over the character of the ordinalist revolu-
tion, nonetheless make common use of key elements in the emotive 
theory of ethics. In the emotive theory, especially as popularized by A. 
J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, normative propositions and simply 
value-laden ones (or value judgments) are treated interchangeably as 
subjective expressions of attitude used persuasively to affect opinion and 
belief in a non cognitive manner. Such propositions are contrasted with 
positive ones that lay claim to scientific objectivity by virtue of their 
susceptibility to empirical confirmation. 
This is of some importance in the contemporary analysis of eco-
nomics methodology, because to the extent that economists treat nor-
lI1ative propositions as noncognitive, good economic theory then 
becomes synonymous with positive economic theory. Yet if, as sug-
gested later, philosophers are right in dismissing the emotive theory as 
fundamentally mistaken, then many normative propositions may be no 
less objective than many positive ones. On this view, the elements of 
good economic theory need neither be necessarily positive nor neces-
sarily empirically confirmable. Rejecting the emotive theory, economists 
would be able to appreciate the different roles normative propositions 
play in particular economic theories, rather than simply regard them as 
noncognitive expressions of attitude. 
The exchange between Cooter-Rappoport and Little is a particularly 
convenient opportunity for raising these points, because of Little's own 
explicit association with the emotive theory of ethics. Indeed, in resisting 
the Cooter-Rappoport view that the persuasive way in which a per-
spective operates is central to the understanding of the normative nature 
of a theory, Little (1985, p. 1187) recalls his own account of the normative 
content of a theory. In his A Critique of Welfare Economics, he drew directly 
on the work of the most influential emotivist philosopher of the later 
1930s and 1940s, Charles L. Stevenson. In Little's account, value-laden 
propositions are identified as value judgments by their use of attitude-
influencing emotive language. 
2. Of course, the conservative nature of Pareto recommendations, as a sort of "second-
best" utilitarianism, has long been appreciated since such judgments rule out trade-
offs in individual well-being via interpersonal utility comparisons that would increase 
overall social utility. But Pareto recommendations are also normatively controversial in 
being consequentialist, paternalist, and rights-ignoring. For a recent survey of some of 
these issues, see the introduction to Sen and Williams (1982) . Of Sen's own many works 
in this area, see especially Sen (1979). 
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Value judgments can, then, be recognized by considering what 
judgments are likely to influence people, not because they describe 
in colourless unemotive language facts which people already ap-
prove of, but because they describe facts in an emotive way, or 
because they are merely emotive and describe nothing at all. (Little, 
1957, p. 70) 
Furthermore, Little adds, following an influential article of Stevenson's 
(1938), to define, "whether implicitly or expliCitly, an emotive word in 
such a way that one can or does apply it to something one wants per-
suasively described" is to give that work a "persuasive definition" (p. 
69). Whether a proposition is value-laden is simply a matter of whether 
it employs emotive language. 
Cooter and Rappoport respond, quite reasonably, that "the emotive 
force or persuasive nature of economic arguments" cannot be located 
"at the level of individual words or phrases, since these only have their 
sense within a particular conceptual framEiwork" (1985, p. 1190). In their 
view, the "recommendatory terminology for expressing conclusions 
would seem . . . to be a secondary matter," since "the persuasive ele-
ment of a body of doctrine" is associated with the perspective or frame-
work in which ideas and data are presented (ibid.). Yet, it is doubtful 
that this critique amounts to more than a difference in emphasis. Little 
could allow that persuasive definitions gather their force because they 
presuppose the perspective of a particular theory . On the other hand, 
Cooter-Rappoport and Little agree that the perspective associated with 
a body of theory has persuasive impact, and that it is this persuasiveness 
that constitutes a theory's normative content. 
Despite the fact that the emotive theory originally developed as more 
or less an adjunct to logical positivist views of science (Ayer, 1952, p. 
20), few seem to appreciate that a critical posture toward the logical 
positivist ideal of science as preeminently positive and objective also 
entails reevaluation of one's views about normative thinking. Indeed, 
for many adherents of the logical positivist dichotomy between the pos-
itive /objective and the normative /nonobjective, abandoning the logical 
positivist conception of science as an exclusively objective endeavor led 
not to abandoning the view of the normative as noncognitive and non-
objective but to a view of all theory as nonobjective and ultimately 
normative . Ironically, then, although elaboration of the emotive theory 
was originally of secondary concern to the logical positivists, among 
many economists its assumptions have both outlasted and displaced 
those underlying the positivists' view of science. 
How this came to be, it is fair to say, is probably tied up with the 
very strong terms in which Ayer and others originally characterized the 
normative in their effort to distinguish and elevate scientific thinking. 
Because the logical positivists believed first and foremost that experience 
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was the test and control of objectivity in science, normative propositions, 
which were clearly neither descriptive of experience nor testable, were 
said to express feelings rather than make assertions. In Ayer's words: 
We can see why it is impossible to find a criterion for determining 
the validity of ethical judgments. It is not because they have an 
"absolute" validity which is mysteriously independent of ordinary 
sense-experience, but because they have no objective validity what-
soever. If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously 
no sense in asking whether what it says is true or false. And we 
have seen that sentences which simply express moral judgments 
do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as 
such do not come under the category of truth or falsehood . They 
are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of 
command is unverifiable - because they do not express genuine 
propositions. (Ayer, 1952, pp. 108-9) 
Since moral judgments are untestable, they cannot be regarded as ob-
jective. Accordingly, although the logical positivists' idea of an objective, 
positive science may be regarded illusory, normative thinking is still 
thought not to be part of any serious theoretical endeavor. 
It might be argued, then, that the ordinalist revolution reflected not 
only a change in research agendas, but also a more or less conscious 
response to the emotivist view that moral dispute is a contest of influence 
in which individuals seek to persuade one another by expressing their 
feelings and attitudes. Ayer asserted that in moral argument one informs 
one's opponent of those facts that seem relevant to the issue at hand, 
but that if disagreement persists, then it must be concluded that "our 
opponent happens to have undergone a different process of moral 'con-
ditioning' from ourselves" and "we abandon the attempt to convince 
him by argument" (Ayer, 1952, p. 110). Lionel Robbins, in his influential 
critique of interpersonal utility comparisons as normative, emphasized 
a similar theme in arguing that should an individual argue that some 
people are capable of experiencing more satisfaction from given incomes 
than others - a value judgment in his view - "we could not show he 
was wrong in any objective sense, any more than we could show that 
we were right" (Robbins, 1935, p . 140). 
Thus, with these views commanding increasing attention in the 
1930s and 1940s, welfare theorists such as Nicholas Kaldor (1939) and 
J. R. Hicks (1941) were faced with a dilemma. Although policy recom-
mendation was a natural concomitant to economic analysis, that nor-
mative judgment in the popular view was deemed irremediably 
noncognitive seemed to preclude any place for policy in a discipline that 
aspired to become an objective science. In effect, the analytical and 
normative components of neoclassical theory seemed in conflict at the 
methodological level. Their response was to seize one of the horns of 
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the dilemma by elaborating nonnormative, presumably objective com-
pensation criteria for proposed policy changes. Compensation criteria 
merely require that those gaining from proposed policy changes only 
be able to compensate losers from such changes without the need to 
measure individuals' respective utilities in the process. Their successful 
elaboration would thus enable economists to make policy recommen-
dations without making interpersonal utility comparisons, which Rob-
bins had insisted could never be free of moral controversy. Hicks, a key 
proponent of this strategy, suggested its rationale in terms directly re-
sponsive to Ayer's view that moral controversy was irresolvable: "If A 
is made so much better off by the change that he could compensate B 
for his loss, and still have something left over, then the reorganization 
is an unequivocal improvement" (Hicks, 1941, p. 111, emphasis added). 
Economics could thus retain its policy dimension because although wel-
fare recommendations are indeed normative, nonetheless they appear 
sufficiently innocuous on this view that it might even be said that it is 
the objective, positive component of neodtl.ssical analysis that ends up 
driving all recommendation. 
Compensation criteria, however, were ultimately abandoned by 
most welfare theorists as flawed and unworkable,3 thus leaving Pareto 
optimality judgments as essentially the sole policy instrument in neo-
classical economics, and the methodological conflict between objective 
economic analysis and nonobjective normative judgment unresolved. 
Thus, in a later reaction to Robbins' arguments, Paul Samuelson retreats 
to something of a cultural relativist position to accommodate the una-
voidable prospect of moral controversy. Asserting that Robbins is "un-
doubtedly correct" in his determination to exclude "ethical value 
judgments" from economic science, Samuelson instead calls for exam-
ination of the consequences of different such judgments, given the sat-
isfaction of the usual Pareto conditions (Samuelson, 1947, pp. 219-21). 
That is, in allowing different moral judgments to enter welfare analysis 
much like data, although one cannot hope to reconcile different opinions 
regarding well-being, one can incorporate such value judgments in con-
crete policy recommendations that, given those assumptions, will not 
arouse controversy. 
In this way, Samuelson, and the many other modern welfare the-
orists who follow him in this, not only adopts the new research agenda 
of neoclassical economics, as the account of Cooter and Rappoport has 
it, but also, it seems more importantly, appears to do so in good part 
because of a conviction that the normative is fundamentally nonobjec-
tive. It seems fair to argue, thus, that what ultimately underlies the 
ordinalist revolution in neoclassical theory is not so much a change in 
3. See Mishan (1960) for a history of these developments . Compensation criteria, however, 
do continue to playa role in cost-benefit analysis . 
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perspective on neoclassical theory as an acceptance of the logical posi-
tivist emotive theory view that normative thinking is nonobjective and 
noncognitive. The change in perspective in the ordinalist revolution, 
then, was less a matter of the way in which the new conceptual frame-
work "singles out objects for analysis, and designates how empirical 
information about them is to be sought, organized and understood," 
and more a matter of a specific response to questions concerning the 
place of normative thinking in economic theory. 
The emotive theory suffered decisive criticism in the immediate dec-
ade after its appearance, so that by the early 1950s, it was largely dis-
credited among professional philosophers.4 The critics reasoned that 
although moral or ethical judgments are often used in a persuasive 
manner, and although they often express the attitudes and emotions of 
those who utter them, moral disagreement is still fundamentally it matter 
of rational argument about objective differences between right and 
wrong, the character of different moral goods, and so forth. Moral dis-
course, furthermore, presupposes a distinction between the expression 
of sentiments peculiar to particular individuals and the expression of 
sentiments approved by individuals generally. That is, moral judgments 
are typically made with the expectation that they will withstand some 
degree of rational scrutiny. They thus often possess an objectivity not 
unlike that conventionally associated with many positive propositions. 
Indeed, it has been argued that moral judgments are subject to at least 
two truth criteria, namely, ethical consistency and that such judgment 
involve something more than temporary attitude and commitment 
(Brandt, 1950, pp. 315-16). 
These developments in philosophy cannot be said to have had much 
impact on economists, who continue to look on the normative much as 
Samuelson did. Cooter and Rappoport, then, might be said to have failed 
to explain the ordinalist revolution in a double sense . On the one hand, 
they uncritically adopt the emotivist view of the normative as a matter 
of persuasiveness. On the other hand, they also overlook an important 
dimension of the ordinalist revolution, the new view of normative think-
ing as nonobjective. This latter failing is not surprising, since that Cooter 
and Rappoport's commitment to the ordinalist view of normative think-
ing blinds them to the very different views of the normative held by the 
cardinalists, as well as to the disappearance of these more objective views 
in the research agendas of the ordinalists. 
Finally, it should also be added that Cooter and Rappoport's meth-
odology of change in res'earch agendas is itself colored by their attach· 
ment to the ordinalist view of the normative as nonobjective. Although 
they recognize that the normative claims the cardinalists make are 
different from those of the ordinalists - Pareto optimality judgments 
4. See Warnock (1960) for a history of these developments. 
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supplant interpersonal utility comparisons in conventional policy 
recommendation - nonetheless, because they conceive of the normative 
as nonobjective, they cannot see in this change the abandonment of an 
objectivist conception for a subjectivist one. Thus, because Cooter and 
Rappoport see the change in neoclassical research agendas to be very 
much a normative matter, the change in research agendas must itself 
also be subjective or noncognitive. In this latter respect, they follow a 
view already widespread among philosophers of science. Yet, perhaps, 
their particular focus on the ordinalist revolution adds, almost by acci-
dent, an insight heretofore missing in philosophers' accounts of changes 
in research agendas in the natural sciences: the considerable appeal of 
the idea of a noncognitive change in research agendas to methodologists 
in economics ultimately itself derives from entrenched convictions about 
objectivity and subjectivity that themselves derive from the view of the 
normative that emerged from the ordinalist revolution. 
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